Background: The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT)

 The situation in Sindh province regarding water distribution, the Indus Waters Treaty, and Punjab’s canal projects is a complex interplay of historical agreements, inter-provincial tensions, and environmental concerns. Below is a detailed explanation of the current situation based on available information:

Background: The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT)
The Indus Waters Treaty, signed in 1960 between India and Pakistan and brokered by the World Bank, governs the use of the Indus River and its tributaries. It allocates:
  • Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Sutlej, Beas) to India for exclusive use.
  • Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan, with limited exceptions for India’s non-consumptive use (e.g., hydropower, domestic use).
  • The treaty established the Permanent Indus Commission to facilitate data exchange and resolve disputes, and it has largely held despite tensions between India and Pakistan.
Within Pakistan, the Indus River System Authority (IRSA), established in 1992, regulates water distribution among the four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan) under the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord. However, disputes between Punjab (an upper riparian province) and Sindh (a lower riparian province) over water allocation have persisted, exacerbated by new canal projects.
Current Situation in Sindh: Water Scarcity and Protests
Sindh, as a lower riparian province, relies heavily on the Indus River for its agriculture, which supports 77% of its irrigated land and contributes 32% to Pakistan’s GDP. However, the province faces chronic water shortages, with reports indicating a 23–45% shortfall in allocated water. For example, from April 1 to May 20, Sindh received only 3.560 million acre-feet (MAF) against an allocated 4.645 MAF. This scarcity threatens agriculture, ecosystems, and livelihoods, particularly in the Indus Delta, where reduced freshwater flows have led to seawater intrusion, mangrove loss, and land degradation.
The Green Pakistan Initiative (GPI), launched in 2023 by Pakistan’s federal government and military, has sparked significant controversy. This $3.3 billion project aims to irrigate 4.8 million acres of barren land through a network of six canals, five of which will draw water from the Indus River, and one from the Sutlej River to irrigate the Cholistan Desert in Punjab. Two canals each are planned for Punjab, Sindh, and Balochistan.
In Sindh, the project has triggered widespread protests due to fears that it will further reduce the province’s water share. Key concerns include:
  • Water Diversion: Sindh fears that Punjab’s upstream canals will divert water from the Indus, exacerbating existing shortages. Critics argue that Punjab’s canals, particularly the Cholistan Canal, rely on unsustainable water sources, as the Sutlej River (allocated to India under the IWT) is often dry, requiring water to be pumped from other rivers like the Indus.
  • Environmental Impact: Reduced Indus flows could devastate the Indus Delta, accelerating salinity intrusion, biodiversity loss, and coastal erosion. The delta’s freshwater capacity has already declined to 8% of its historical levels, and past floods (e.g., 2022) have damaged 4.4 million acres of farmland and 7,300 km of canal infrastructure in Sindh.
  • Inter-Provincial Tensions: Sindh perceives the project as favoring Punjab, deepening mistrust. Data from IRSA shows Sindh faced a 40% water shortage between 1999 and 2023, compared to Punjab’s 15%. Historical grievances, such as the unbuilt Kalabagh Dam, fuel Sindh’s opposition to upstream projects.
  • Political Resistance: The Sindh government, led by the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), has passed resolutions demanding a halt to the canal project. Protests, led by groups like the Sindh Taraqi Pasand Party and Qaumi Awami Tehreek, have occurred across cities like Karachi, Hyderabad, and Sujawal. Sindh’s Irrigation Minister, Jam Khan Shoro, warned that the Cholistan Canal could “turn Sindh barren.”
Punjab’s Canal Projects and Water Allocation
Punjab, as the upper riparian province, has historically benefited from greater access to Indus water due to its geographical position and infrastructure, including the Indus Basin Irrigation System (IBIS), which irrigates 44 million acres nationwide. The GPI’s canal projects aim to enhance agricultural productivity in Punjab’s Cholistan region, a desert area, by diverting water from the Indus and Sutlej.
Key details about Punjab’s canal plans:
  • Cholistan Canal: This canal, part of the GPI, aims to irrigate 1.2 million acres in Punjab’s Cholistan Desert. However, it relies on the Sutlej River, which is allocated to India under the IWT and often dry. To compensate, authorities are manually pumping water from other rivers, including the Indus, raising concerns about sustainability and fairness.
  • Water Management: Punjab argues that the canals will use its allocated water share under the 1991 Accord and improve food security. However, Sindh contends that Punjab’s existing irrigation systems, like the Rahim Yar Khan-Bahawalpur-Sadiqabad (RQBS) canal, already receive disproportionate water compared to Sindh’s largest canal (Nara, with a capacity of 13,649 cusecs).
  • Environmental and Health Concerns: The Ravi and Sutlej rivers, used in Punjab, are heavily polluted with agricultural runoff and industrial waste, contributing to health issues like digestive system diseases in southern Punjab. Critics argue that prioritizing drinking water over irrigation should be the focus.
Sindh’s Grievances and Legal Arguments
Sindh’s opposition is rooted in historical and legal frameworks:
  • 1991 Water Apportionment Accord: Sindh argues that the GPI violates the accord, which guarantees provincial water shares. The accord reduced Sindh’s historical claim to 75% of Indus water to 40%, and further diversions are seen as unfair.
  • Provincial Autonomy: The 18th Amendment to Pakistan’s Constitution emphasizes provincial rights, and Sindh claims the federal government and Punjab bypassed consultation with the Council of Common Interests (CCI), a body meant to resolve inter-provincial disputes.
  • IRSA’s Role: Sindh’s representative in IRSA, Mohammad Ehsan Leghari, has criticized the project, noting Pakistan’s chronic water shortages (up to 50% in Sindh and Balochistan during summer). He questions the availability of water for new canals.
  • Historical Precedent: Sindh cites past mismanagement, such as the Tarbela Dam, which stores 12 MAF annually but releases water at times that do not align with Sindh’s agricultural needs (e.g., before the monsoon, when Sindh needs water most).
Current Developments and Tensions
  • Protests and Political Backlash: Since the GPI’s announcement, protests have intensified in Sindh, with demonstrations in December 2024 and March 2025. Social media posts on X reflect public anger, with hashtags like #NoMoreCanalsOnIndus and #SindhWaterRights trending. Some posts allege that the Sindh government, despite opposing the project publicly, issued notifications permitting the canals, though these claims are unverified.
  • Water Shortages Worsen: In March 2025, major reservoirs like Mangla Dam reached their dead level, and Tarbela and Chashma were close to depletion, leading IRSA to warn of a 35% water shortage for the Rabi season. This has heightened fears in Sindh about further upstream diversions.
  • Federal Response: Federal Minister Ahsan Iqbal has dismissed Sindh’s objections as “baseless,” claiming the canals will not affect Sindh’s water share. However, water experts like Hassan Abbas argue that the Cholistan Canal is “unscientific” due to the region’s uneven terrain and reliance on unsustainable water sources.
Broader Implications
  • Ecological Damage: The Indus Delta is at risk of collapse due to reduced flows, threatening fisheries, mangroves, and coastal communities. The 2022 floods highlighted Sindh’s vulnerability, and further water diversions could exacerbate such disasters.
  • Inter-Provincial Divide: The canal project has fueled Sindhi nationalism and accusations of Punjab’s dominance, risking national unity. Historical parallels, like the 1971 secession of Bangladesh, are invoked to underscore the dangers of ignoring provincial grievances.
  • Climate Change: Decreasing water levels due to climate change and overexploitation stress Pakistan’s river system, making equitable distribution even more critical.
Potential Solutions
Experts and stakeholders have proposed several measures to address the conflict:
  • Transparent Data Sharing: Real-time water flow data could build trust among provinces.
  • Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs): Comprehensive EIAs for the canals could evaluate their impact on Sindh and the Indus Delta, with mitigation measures like minimum downstream flows.
  • Strengthening IRSA: Empowering IRSA to enforce the 1991 Accord and resolve disputes impartially could reduce tensions.
  • Modern Irrigation Techniques: Investing in drip irrigation and upgrading existing canals could reduce water wastage in both Punjab and Sindh.
  • CCI Engagement: Convening the CCI to discuss the project and ensure consensus would respect provincial autonomy.
  • Compensation for Sindh: Development projects, such as reservoirs or Indus Delta restoration, could offset any water losses.
Conclusion
Sindh’s concerns stem from fears that Punjab’s canal projects, particularly under the Green Pakistan Initiative, will exacerbate its water scarcity, threaten agriculture, and damage the Indus Delta. The Indus Waters Treaty, while relevant for India-Pakistan relations, indirectly shapes this dispute, as Punjab’s reliance on the Sutlej (allocated to India) forces it to draw from the Indus, impacting Sindh. Historical inequities, lack of transparency, and environmental risks have fueled protests and political tensions. Resolving the issue requires equitable water management, robust institutional oversight, and inclusive dialogue to balance Punjab’s agricultural ambitions with Sindh’s survival.

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